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Abstract 
This study explores how female marriage migrants employ various forms of social closure to help 
them  adapt  to  the  receiving  society.  As  for  female  migration  itself,  although  it  has  begun  to 
dominate the migration flow it has not yet been discussed and theorized as a unique phenomenon in 
immigration  studies.  This  phenomenon  must,  however,  be  viewed  within  the  context  of 
international  hypergamy,  which  has  become  an  increasingly  notable  trend  in  many  countries, 
especially those of East Asia. Female marriage migrants, coming to Taiwan chiefly from Southeast 
Asian countries and from China, often are depicted by the mainstream discourse as being inferior. 
This study has found that by creating, and in some cases transforming, social closure, these female 
marriage migrants are able to reshape their group identity, to reposition themselves within the 
stratification at least within the  parameters of their own minds, and thereby to cope with the 
discriminatory environment and unfavorable social hierarchy of Taiwanese society. 
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Introduction 
A new trend of inter-national marriage has emerged and become especially notable in 
East Asian countries such as Taiwan, Korea, and Japan, as men in these economically 
developed countries seek marriage partners coming from the region’s less developed 
countries,  or  economically  deprived  areas  (Asakura,  2002;  Kim,  2006;  Lee,  2003; 
Nakamatsu, 2003; Ochiai et al., 2006; Piper & Roces, 2003). This trend of inter-national 
hypergamy  can  be  seen  as  emerging  out  of  the  collision  of  patrilineal  tradition  and 
bourgeoning feminism. On the one hand, the patriarchical culture shared by these East 
Asian countries places a strong emphasis on “producing a male heir” while implicitly 
preaching a creed of “the man marries down, the woman marries up.” On the other 
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hand, the newly gained economic independence of young women has made a single 
lifestyle a valid option, especially when a woman can’t find a man who fulfills “the three 
highs”: high education, high income, and high height (tallness). Certainly in Taiwan the 
less desirable men, especially those who are either working class or rural farmers, find 
themselves at a great disadvantage in their local marriage market. Thus taking a bride 
from China or from the neighboring Southeast Asian nations has become an attractive 
option  for  them,  given  that  their  socioeconomic  disadvantage  becomes  virtually 
unnoticeable owing to the unequal development among the various regions (Hsia, 2002). 
Within East Asia, Taiwan has one of the lowest birth rates and also the highest 
percentage of inter-national marriage (Jennings, 2010; Shay, 2010). The influx of female 
marriage migrants (henceforth, FMM), coming mostly from China and from Southeast 
Asian countries, has made Taiwan a multi-ethnic society. As of 2003 the number of FMM 
had jumped to 31.9 percent, meaning that 1 out of 3.1 Taiwanese men was marrying a 
woman  from  outside  Taiwan  (Ministry-of-the-Interior,  2004).  The  FMM  generally  are 
perceived as being disadvantaged, less educated, and possibly incapable mothers owing 
to their cultural-linguistic differences, and thus there is a certain degree of discrimination, 
or at least prejudice, directed against them. In recent years the government has begun to 
implement tighter visa controls and to ban for-profit marriage brokers, owing to the 
supposed “public concern” about “fake marriage, real prostitution” (M.-L. Chen, 2004), 
thereby  seeming  to  show  support  for  such  comments  uttered  about  the  FMM  as 
“lowering the quality of the population” (H.-G. Chen, 2004). Views of the latter eugenic 
kind have cropped up in the discourses of Taiwan’s media (M.-L. Chen, 2004; Gao, 2003), 
its government (Han, 2004), its legislators (H.-G. Chen, 2004; Ke, 2006), its schools and 
teachers (Wang et al., 2006), and even in academic studies (Liu, 2002). Although the 
above-mentioned tightened governmental controls have cut 2003’s percentage almost in 
half, in 2008 foreign brides still were accounting for 15 percent of Taiwan’s marriages 
(Monlake, 2010). 
While for many years my fieldwork has focused on the strategies FMM use to adapt 
themselves to the new host society, community, and family, here I am paying special 
attention to the various ways in which social boundaries are created, transformed, and 
maintained, boundaries that have their objective ethno-socioeconomic aspect but that 
nonetheless live, first and foremost, within the minds of the social actors themselves. 
The present analysis focuses on the issue of social closure, in relation to the role it plays 
in helping FMM to adapt themselves to the host society of Taiwan. Before we can begin 
to trace the process of social closure, however, as it plays itself out within the minds and 
lives of the FMM, I will begin with an overview, based on my fieldwork, of the overall 
situation for the FMM in today’s Taiwan.  
Research background, and societal perceptions of the FMM 
Included in this study are both C-FMM and SEA-FMM, living in both rural and urban areas 
of Taiwan. Of the FMM I interviewed, half came to Taiwan from Mainland China and thus 
speak  the  same  language  as  their  receiving  families,  even  if  with  a  distinguishable     Kuo / Subversions of social hierarchy 
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Mainland accent. The other half are Southeast Asian FMM who have emigrated to Taiwan 
from Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand and hence are not native speakers of Chinese but 
rather have had to learn it. Indeed, in the more than eight years that these women have 
lived in Taiwan, all of them have gained a basic fluency in Chinese (Mandarin) and/or 
Taiwanese,
2  with  the  latter  being  a  dialect  of  Mandarin  commonly  used  in  rural 
communities. 
Most of the C-FMM in the study have a higher educational level than do the SEA -
FMM – a fact more or less reflective of the overall situation in Taiwan (Department of 
Civil Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, 2006). And yet, due to the hostility between the 
Taiwanese and Chinese governments, the Mainland Chinese diplomas possessed by C-
FMM  are  under  numerous  constraints,  which  means  that  these  women’s  previous 
educational achievements often are not deemed valid in Taiwan, or at least have to be 
certified on a case-by-case basis (Mainland Affairs Council, 2010). 
Both the Chinese and the Southeast Asian-FMMs are indeed subjected to a certain 
degree of prejudice or even discrimination emanating from both public discourse and the 
media, but the two groups experience some notable differences in this regard. Given 
that the Mandarin accent of the Chinese FMM tends to make them recognizable by the 
native-born  Taiwanese,  their  full  command  of  the  language  doesn’t  keep  them  from 
being subjected to certain stereotypes in their everyday lives. Indeed, just like the SEA-
FMM, they often are seen by the Taiwanese as having come from a “backward country” 
and having married “old men” who are either “retarded or low income.” Thus they are 
“gold-diggers”  who  want  to  steal  the  resources  of  Taiwan,  and  eventually  they  will 
“lower  the  quality  of  the  population”  (Chao,  2009;  Wang,  2003).  In  addition  to  the 
stereotype of being “low-quality gold-diggers” they are subjected to hostilities, or at 
least  strong  skepticisms,  owing  to  the  ongoing  tension  between  Taiwan  and  China. 
Indeed their intention in coming to Taiwan, and/or their true devotion to their families, 
are more often called into question than is the case with the SEA-FMM (Z.-R. Chen & Yu, 
2005). A study done by Chen and Yu (2005) has shown that the perceptions of Mainland-
born FMM held by native-born Taiwanese tend to line up with the particular political 
inclination  of  each  Taiwanese  individual.  More  specifically,  the  more  pro-Taiwanese-
independence  the  individual  is,  the  more  negative  his  or  her  attitude  is  likely  to  be 
toward the C-FMM, and indeed toward all those immigration-related policies that help 
the C-FMM even though they also benefit the SEA-FMM.  
My study also has found, however, a significant difference between the attitudes 
held by the Taiwanese toward the C-FMM and the SEA-FMM. The host society’s negative 
impressions of the Chinese FMM often do not include any real doubt as to their capability 
to be good mothers, with the absence of such a prejudice being particularly notable in 
the rural areas. A number of comments came my way – some from teachers and school 
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staff members, some from “meddlesome people” who knew I was doing research on 
this topic; usually in private, but sometimes in more public settings – to the effect that 
the  Chinese  FMM,  as  compared  to  the  Southeast  Asian  ones,  experiences  “fewer 
problems” when getting involved in their children’s education. Indeed one rural principal 
I  spoke  to,  in  a  private  interview,  even  suggested  that  Chinese  FMM  make  the  best 
mothers:  
“Simply  my  own  experience  tells  me  that  the  children  of  the  Mainland  brides 
sometimes – sometimes – do even better than the native ones. The mothers are 
more capable; you know: those Mainlanders are very aggressive!” 
That principal’s viewpoint was echoed by others I talked with in many rural areas. C-
FMM often were spoken of as being “diligent,” “capable,” and “active,” even if it at 
times  those  words  were  loaded  with  such  negative  connotations  as  “aggressive,” 
“impolite,” and “calculating.” When it comes to these women’s involvements in their 
children’s education, however, those negative qualities seem to be seen by teachers, 
school personnel, family members, and neighbors as doing little to undercut the C-FMM’ 
basically positive educational involvements. 
 In notable contrast to the generally rather muted, or hidden, stereotyping directed 
toward C-FMM – it rarely goes much farther than their being disparaged as incapable 
mothers owing to their, or more accurately their receiving families,’ low socioeconomic 
status – that which the SEA-FMMs are subjected to is especially vicious, as in references 
being made to their “bloodline” or their being accused, even by legislators, of having 
“genetic  defects”  (Ke,  2006).  Some  observers  have  even  used  the  term  “triple 
discrimination” to refer to the cultural-linguistic, racial, and socioeconomic components 
of the discrimination such immigrants are up against (H.-G. Chen, 2001, 2004; C.-Q. Wang 
& Chen, 2004; Zhu &  Meng, 2004). Granted, the SEA-FMM are treated better by the 
government  when  it  comes  to  length  of  time  needed  to  attain  permanent-residency 
status,  but  as  compared  to  the  C-FMM  they  have  suffered  more  in  terms  of  being 
stereotyped  as  incapable  mothers.  Indeed,  in  the  course  of  my  fieldwork  I  often 
encountered Taiwanese people making such disparaging comments. For example, a part-
time worker at the Taipei Immigration Center, affiliated with the Taipei city government, 
said the following after I had asked to speak with one of the Southeast Asian volunteer 
translators:  
“She’s not here yet. She must be late. You know, Southeast Asian people are just 
lazier.  .  .  .  You  know  that’s  why  they  [the  SEA-FMM]  marry  into  Taiwan,  not  us 
getting married there!”  
Even schoolteachers sometimes made comments like this one: “It isn’t that they 
don’t want to be good moms; it’s that they aren’t able to.” A teacher in the city of Taipei 
sought  me  out  when  she  heard  I  was  doing  research  on  the  FMMs’  educational 
involvements and said this:      Kuo / Subversions of social hierarchy 
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“I think it is a very important issue, since the children born to foreign brides are 
increasing rapidly. . . . Even though I have not taught any of them, I would guess they 
are slow learners not because they are stupid, [but] just because they come mostly 
from disadvantaged families – the fathers are of low socioeconomic status, and the 
mothers don’t speak any Chinese.”  
One sees the prejudice at work most clearly in moderate-sounding views such as 
that one. For while most of the SEA-FMM are indeed disadvantaged in terms of their 
socio-economic  status  and/or  their  cultural-linguistic  unfamiliarity,  my  fieldwork 
observations showed me that most of them have in fact turned themselves into very 
good Chinese speakers by the time their children are of primary-school age. And as for 
the children of the SEA-FMM supposedly being “slow learners,” I found that most of this 
study’s children who have SEA-FMM mothers are in fact doing splendidly in school.  
Regardless,  the  social  hierarchy  has  slowly  formed  within  and  around  the 
mainstream ideology, with the FMM being located down in its lowest stratum, and this 
stratification, which some have called “racism with classes” (Tseng, 2009), presents a 
great challenge to the FMM. In the next session we will be exploring the ways in which 
the  FMM  maintain  and  revise  the  various  form  of  social  closure,  all  as  a  part  of  the 
ongoing process of adapting themselves to the receiving society of Taiwan. 
 
Social closure employed by FMM as an adaptation strategy 
While the concept of social closure has long been used by Weberian theorists to explain 
how advantages, resources, and status are accumulated and maintained by members of 
certain social groups (Parkins 1972, 1979; Weber, 1978), the present study will instead be 
looking  at  the  various  uses  to  which  social  closure  is  put  by  FMM  as  an  adaptation 
strategy, with special attention being paid to the difference in this regard between the 
Chinese and the Southeast Asian women. 
 
Dual closure as the C-FMMs adaptation strategy  
My study has found that as the C-FMM strive to adapt themselves to the receiving 
Taiwanese society they employ what Parkins (1972, 1979) has called “dual closure.” This 
type of social closure is a hybrid of the exclusionary type, which seeks to keep others 
beneath  one  in  the  social  hierarchy,  and  the  usurpationary  type,  whereby  FMM 
envisioning themselves as being not just equal, but in some cases even superior, to those 
inhabiting the higher social strata. 
 
Exclusionary closure 
My fieldwork revealed that the Chinese FMM quite invariably take a strong pride in being 
“ethnic Chinese,” with that fact bringing them at least an initial sense of confidence and 
entitlement.  When  one  also  takes  into  consideration  the  shared-language  factor Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
 
 
90 
between the C-FMM and the native Taiwanese, one can understand why most of the 
Chinese  FMM  begin  by  seeing  themselves  as  “the  same”  as  the  native  Taiwanese  in 
terms of “bloodline” and culture, and thus are unable to take seriously the stereotypes 
imposed upon all the FMM. Or to speak more precisely, even as they are slowly forced to 
acknowledge  the  difficulties  they  are  having  in  adjusting  to  the  new  environment  of 
Taiwan, despite their supposedly shared ethnic and cultural identity with their hosts, they 
go out of their way to insist that their own difficulties aren’t at all comparable to the far 
worse ones experienced by their SEA-FMM counterparts, from whom they in fact go to 
great lengths to distance themselves. Typical in this regard is the following comment 
made by Ting-hui, a Chinese FMM living in Taipei: 
I feel that the adjustment of the Mainland brides should be fine. The real problem is 
when the bride comes from Vietnam. I feel they are much worse than us! I read in the 
newspaper that [the children of SEA-FMM say such things as] “My mother does not 
talk,” because their Vietnamese mothers do not speak Chinese, and therefore are 
being discriminated against. 
Another  C-FMM,  Han-yu,  was  even  more  blatant  in  her  attempt  to  set  up  a 
rigorously us-versus-them dichotomy: 
We  are  not  exactly  “foreign  brides”  –  we  are  all  Chinese!  You  [the  researchers] 
should give more concern to the SEA-FMMs. They face great challenges and are a 
huge  problem  to  our  society.  They  are  different  –  different  bloodline,  different 
culture. Their adjustment will be difficult. How can they educate their children, if they 
don’t even speak Chinese? We should give them more attention. Our society should 
focus on them. 
Thus, whereas mainstream Taiwanese society and its media categorize the FMM 
within a single social grouping, most of the C-FMM I got to know while doing my research 
quite insistently depicted themselves as being part of mainstream Chinese culture, with 
Taiwan and China sharing “the same culture and the same bloodline.” This means, by 
reverse implication, that in their eyes it is the SEA-FMM who are the “real” outsiders. This 
subtle  form  of  social  closure  allows  the  C-FMM  to  band  together  with  the  host 
Taiwanese, even if only within the confines of their own minds, to make common cause 
against the SEA-FMM, thereby boosting the C-FMMs’ sense of confidence. The sense of 
sameness also leads those women to hold high expectations with respect to quality of 
life, treatment by host families, and professional opportunities, but all too often those 
initially  high  hopes  end  up  betraying  these  women  into  sheer  disappointment. 
Nonetheless my fieldwork revealed, time and again, that an FMM’s positive perception of 
her own capital is itself, in many if not all cases, a great help to her as she struggles to 
adapt to the new culture. This is very much true of Chinese FMMs like Shu-shu, Ting-hui, 
and Su-rong, for my interviews with and observations of them led me to believe that 
their high regard for their own cultural heritage translates into a positive perception of 
their own ability to do meaningful work and to educate their children.      Kuo / Subversions of social hierarchy 
 
 
91 
I also soon saw the other side of this coin, however, in the form of women like Si-
wei. Her fluent Chinese and her high-school diploma have not brought her the life she 
had  hoped  for.  When  she  first  thought  of  marrying  into  Taiwan  she  envisioned  “a 
prosperous life and a happy family, just like the ones seen on Taiwanese soap operas [the 
shows she watched back in Mainland China],” and making money, but instead she has 
ended up “trapped” in the small rural community where there are only a few factory 
jobs, not the service job she still hopes to find. Worse yet, her controlling in-laws don’t 
allow her to go to Taipei to work, demand that she give birth to a lot of children, and take 
over her job as a mother. This is how she vented her anger to me:  
I am all stuck here, there is nothing I can do! . . . My husband and his family treat me 
badly. I told them, “You should have married a Vietnamese bride! You should not 
have married me!” 
It is understandable that Si-wei tries to cope with her unhappiness by implicitly 
stereotyping “Vietnamese brides” as being better able to endure bad treatment from 
their receiving families. Indeed, many of the people I met with during my fieldwork, and 
especially those living in Taiwan’s rural areas where people seem to feel freer to openly 
reveal  their  prejudices,  suggested  that  the  Southeast  Asian  brides  are  incapable  and 
docile whereas the Mainland brides are capable and aggressive. 
Unfortunately,  such  outlooks  tend  to  play  right  into  the  hands  of  the  C-FMMs’ 
implicit strategy of envisioning a two-tier society, with those “of the Chinese bloodline 
and culture” being perched securely on the top tier while the “foreigners” are stowed 
away down below. For in essence the SEA-FMM are assigned two negatives – “docile and 
incapable” – whereas the C-FMM are given only one – “capable” – with their supposed 
“aggressiveness” amounting to little more than forgivable bad manners, in the minds of 
native Taiwanese like that high-school principal we listened to earlier, lauding the C-FMM 
for being the best mothers. 
 
Usurpationary closure 
We have seen how the C-FMMs’ initial sense of pride in being ethnic  Chinese and in 
speaking  good  Mandarin  can  lead  first  to  high  expectations  and  then  to  great 
disappointment. Some of the FMM in my study found themselves married into a family 
that “does not look like what we thought [saw] on TV [Taiwanese soap opera] at our 
place,” as Tian-xin put it in our conversation. Especially in Taiwan’s rural areas, where 
there are far fewer job opportunities and the FMM have far less access to formal societal 
resources of the kind provided by organizations such as the government’s Immigration 
Hall  and  various  NGOs,  the  dearth  of  fiscal,  social,  and  personal  (self-development) 
opportunities  leads  many  C-FMMs  to  feel  severely  constrained,  in  the  sense  of  their 
having few real life-options. Thus one can readily understand why these FMMs so often 
adopt  an  additional  stance  of  “usurpationary  closure”  –  conceiving  of  themselves  as 
living  within  a  bubble  of  cultural  superiority  –  as  they  seek  to  make  sense  of  their Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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disappointment and to deal with their sadness. This is what is Su-rong, denizen of a small 
village in southern Taiwan, once told me: 
Indeed, the material life here is better . . . but there is no culture. In our place [her 
hometown in Mainland China], even though the material aspect is not as good, all of 
the people are cultured.  
In other words, the C-FMM arrive at a sense of social closure essentially by vaunting 
themselves  as  being  members  of  a  superior  culture.  This  mindset,  while  widespread 
among all the C-FMM I studied, tends to be held most tenaciously by those living in rural 
areas. The following comments which were shared with me by Su-rong and Si-wei, both 
of  them  denizens  of  a  small  village  in  the  countryside,  virtually  equate  the  region’s 
conservative values with a lack of culture. Si-wei had this to say: 
Taiwan is very chaotic. There’s a huge disparity with regard to its living standard. 
Taipei’s living standard is high, but it’s tough to live in the southern part of Taiwan. 
There is much more disappointment than opportunity here. People here also are very 
different [from the people in Taipei]. . . . Here [in rural Taiwan] is very conservative. 
People are mean, uncultured, and you can’t really reason with them. You can’t say 
many things to them. The best way is to keep silent. 
Now here’s Su-rong again:  
I came here hoping to have better opportunities, to make more money to help my 
family back home, only to find out that the life here in the countryside is not at all 
what I had imagined and had seen on Taiwanese TV. The environment here is not 
much better than it is back home [in China] . . . It is so conservative here! I feel that 
two children are more than enough, but my in-laws think, “The more, the better!” No 
one is like that in my place [home country]. 
What such comments make clear to us is that this kind of usurpationary closure – 
envisioning one’s group as being unfairly disadvantaged in its relation to the higher social 
strata  –  is  a  strategy  employed  by  immigrants  whose  hope  of  coming  to  a  place  of 
possible social advancement has been shattered upon its impact with rural Taiwanese 
culture.  As  is  attested to  by  the  firsthand  experience  of  my  fieldwork,  the  culture  is 
indeed conservative and explicitly patrilineal, and its members do really harbor the usual 
suspicions  about  “those  Mainlanders.”  Many  of  the  local  people  I  encountered  and 
talked with in the rural areas seemed eager to share with me, many times right in front of 
an FMM, such “digs” about the C-FMM as a group as this one, which was said in a tone 
full of mocking malice: “She [the FMM] came from ‘that side.’” Similarly, Si-wei’s mother-
in-law once explained to me that a particular kind of vegetable is called “mainland girl” 
“because  it  is  [very  common  and  therefore]  so  cheap!”  Given  such  none-too-secret, 
society-wide  discrimination,  even  C-FMMs  who  also  experience  mistreatment  at  the 
hands of their husbands and in-laws do not interpret it as a form of discrimination against     Kuo / Subversions of social hierarchy 
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them; rather, they come up with creative ways of reinventing their social categories and 
even Taiwan’s social hierarchy itself.  
Although  the  women  I  met  with  during  my  fieldwork  in  a  small  village  in  rural 
Taiwan  were  consistently  being  confronted  by  social  hierarchization  and  upfront 
discrimination, I never once heard any woman describe her situation by using qishi, the 
Chinese word for “discrimination.” As the comments made by Si-wei and Su-rong make 
clear, all of the ill-speaking and mean-acting that these women encounter is taken by 
them, who feel trapped and cut off from all hope in this small pace, as simply bespeaking 
the vulgarity of the local people. Si-wei once spoke of being “amazed by the low quality 
and the stupidity of these rural people,” and another C-FMS, Su-rong, had so taken on 
the mentality that she feared for the downward assimilation of her children with the 
native Taiwanese! 
We have seen how the “dual closure” strategy employed by the C-FMM helps these 
women to deal with the discrimination and hardship they encounter in their everyday 
lives. The exclusionary mode can be seen at work in the way they psychologically position 
themselves as being culturally superior to the SEA-FMM. Conversely, the usurpationary 
mode  allows  them  to  subvert  the  existing  social  hierarchy  by  implying  that  they  are 
culturally superior to a Taiwanese culture which, especially in the rural areas, is still tied 
to outmoded patrilineal values.  
 SEA-FMM’s self-exclusionary transgressions in social stratification 
The SEA-FMMs’ utilization of social closure is notably different from that of their Chinese 
counterparts. My interviews with and observations of some of Taiwan’s FMM have led 
me to see that as compared to their C-FMM counterparts, it is the SEA-FMM who more 
readily buy into the ideology of inferiority that is being purveyed to them via both the 
media  and  their  daily  interactions  with  the  receiving  society.  While  the  assimilists  in 
Taiwan would be likely to pounce on the language difference as supposedly the chief 
factor in this regard, I have known too many SEA-FMM who have mastered Mandarin 
with relative ease and yet have maintained a belief in the social inferiority of their group. 
Regardless, they view themselves as outsiders to start with, and thus are more compliant 
with the stereotypes imposed upon them.  
Many SEA-FMM told me they felt different from or even inferior to the Taiwanese, 
especially when they first came to Taiwan. Tuti, for example, said this:  
I  was  very  very  nervous  when  I  first  married  here,  [because]  I  heard  it  is  very 
different and modern here in Taiwan. And after I came here, I thought the people 
were very different from our place [town in Vietnam]. [For example,] in our place we 
do  not  have  so  many  cars  on  the  street.  It  feels  very  different.  People  [the 
Taiwanese] are very different, too. They all look like beautiful people on TV. [Shyly 
smiles.] I feel very different [from them]. 
On many occasions during my fieldwork, I heard from SEA-FMM such responses to 
my queries as “I don’t have the answer for you – I am Southeast Asian,” and “I am only a Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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foreign  bride.”  Such  comments  cropped  up  all  the  more  frequently  in  the  relatively 
remote countryside I visited, where patrilocal residence is the norm, and where most 
FMM enjoy less freedom in their everyday lives than do their urban counterparts. What I 
soon came to understand is that the real issue for most of those devoted mothers is not 
their own anxiety but rather their concern that their children will experience a sense of 
inferiority much like their own. Siti, for instance, talked about not wanting her child to be 
seen by others as the “son of a foreign bride,” for that might “do him harm.”  
I was struck during my observations by the way women like Siti and Tri consciously 
seek to distance themselves from their children. Siti told me she does this “so that he 
[my son] won’t be seen [by his family members] as being closer to me.” On another 
occasion she told me how lucky she is to have been able to marry into Taiwan, and as I 
watched and listened I discerned that she really does believe what her family members 
have told her, about her not having the ability to educate the children. Many SEA-FMM 
like  Siti  had  deeply  bought  into  the  ideology  of  their  inferiority  in  relation  to  the 
mainstream society. 
Indeed, as one listens more closely one begins to understand what great lengths 
most, if not all, of these women go to, in order to distinguish themselves as individuals 
from the group to which they belong. I have dubbed this seemingly unique form of social 
closure “self-exclusionary” because it entails a FMM consciously distancing herself from 
her own group, a group often perceived as being at the bottom of the stratification, 
without have to challenge that social hierarchy. In this study we have learned by listening 
into Tuti and Siti’s remarks, how readily the SEA-FMMs’ accept their low social ranking as 
newcomers, with consequent complete lack of interest in taking a usurpationary stance 
in the C-FMM manner. Whereas both the exclusionary and the usurpationary modes of 
social closure have long been seen as intrinsically serving to move the group as a whole 
higher  up  the  social  hierarchy,  in  this  self-exclusionary  case  we  have  a  number  of 
individual SEA-FMM distinguishing themselves from their own group in order to enable 
their own social advancement.  
These  women  have  developed  various  social-grouping  strategies  to  help  them 
break out of the vicious stereotyping based on their unique differences, whether that 
means their morality, personality, or stocks of capital. All of which puts them ahead of 
their FMM peers in their struggle of adaptation, at least in their own eyes, and distances 
them from the rest of the group, the “inferior group” in the eyes of Taiwanese and now 
the SEA-FMM themselves. Some women put down the other members of their ethnic 
group by comparing their own high morale and work ethic, with supposedly lazy and 
immoral habits of all the other SEA-FMM, some paint themselves as being more proactive 
and fearless, their peers as passive and defeatist, and some readily admit that they have 
simply “lucked out,” often with the help of unusually supportive husbands and in-laws. 
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Morality  
The initial feeling of difference from Taiwanese society is often compounded for the SEA-
FMM  by  the  women’s  own  internalization  of  the  stereotypes  fostered  by  the  local 
people, especially in the rural areas where traditional values and stereotypes are more 
strongly  held.  Thus  I  found  that  the  rural  SEA-FMM  are  the  ones  that  who  take  the 
strongest  stand  in  distinguishing  themselves  from  other  SEA-FMM.  One  common 
strategy, as seen in Sinta and Sari, is to cite their higher morale in comparison with the 
other SEA-FMM. Sinta had this to say when we first met: 
  Most of my friends are Taiwanese. I don’t hang out with the Indonesians. Many of 
them [in my village] are bad . . . they sleep around. 
Sari had this to say: 
Those foreign brides are really bad. They run away. They can’t endure hardship, they 
just want to live a good life, very lazy. Did you know what happened here [in our 
village] not long ago? This one ran away, and now she’s living with a man in our 
village, the same village!! Her husband spent 200,000 NT [6000 USD] to marry her, 
and after a few months she ran away. They only think about themselves, and that’s 
not even the worst. Some women have children, and run away. They abandon their 
children. . . . They can’t take [the hardship] here. Only think about themselves. Those 
foreign brides have no heart!   
Both Sinta and Sari identify themselves with the Taiwanese by saying that “most of 
my  friends  are  Taiwanese,  I  don’t  hang  out  with  Indonesians,”  and  in  Sari’s  case  by 
demonizing foreign brides as “those” people who “just want to live a good life” and 
“have no heart.” By doing so, Sinta and Sari put themselves as members of the native 
Taiwanese. Sinta goes even farther by continually making comments about her fellow 
SEA-FMM who “sleep around,” “are lazy,” and “only think about themselves.” It is by 
adopting such morally superior stances that Sinta and Sri are able to envision themselves 
being different from “those Southeast Asians.”  
Personality  
In some cases and situations, SEA-FMM approach this “us vs. them” distinction by noting 
their  own  unique  temperaments  and  personalities.  Tasanee  is  typical  of  one  such 
approach, that of emphasizing her own intensely proactive attitude: 
All  the  Southeast  Asians  are  very  isolated  and  docile.  I  am  probably  the  only 
exception [laughs loudly and mischievously]. My husband is really lucky [jokingly]. 
You know, most of the Southeast Asians come here and they really don’t know their 
rights.  Their  lives  are  very  very  different  from  me.  They  look  down  upon  other 
foreign brides, but they would not dare to look down upon me. I am mean! [Laughs]. 
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Tuti is a good representative of another approach these women take, one in which 
they openly express both their gratitude to the native Taiwanese who have helped them 
to become socially integrated and their hope that their fellow SEA-FMM will be given 
similar guidance:  
I was very unhappy when I first came [to Taiwan]. My Chinese was bad, and I stayed 
home all day. It was very boring. After a while my Chinese became better, and I 
started  to  go  out  and  work  at  the  breakfast  shop.  That’s  when  I  met  a  lot  of 
Taiwanese who are really really really nice to me! They treat me like their daughter. . . 
. I did not know there were so many nice people! After I met them I became very 
happy and optimistic. It is really important to learn Chinese, so one can work and 
make money, make friends, and have confidence and happiness . . . I hope the other 
foreign brides can all become [empowered] like me. . . . They just don’t make the 
effort. 
We note here that Tuti and Tasanee implicitly point out the perceived gap between 
themselves and the other SEA-FMM. AS opposed to Sinta and Sari’s moralistic stance, 
Tuti and Tasanee lay the stress on their own personality and strength, and even their 
sheer good fortune. Above all, it is their proactive stance of “going out” and “making a 
difference” which they are proud of. Indeed, Tasanee’s newfound confidence has come 
her way largely via an empowerment group that was put together by some Taiwanese 
sociologists and professors, even though she herself interprets her sense of confidence 
as coming from her nature of being a “born fighter” whereas her fellow SEA-FMM are (as 
we heard her say earlier) “isolated and docile.” For Tuti, on the other hand, it is her 
diligence that causes her to stand out and to be able to adapt to life in Taiwan whereas 
other SEA-FMM just “don’t make the effort.” Here is her take on  why there is such a big 
difference between her and the other SEA-FMM: 
Learning Chinese is not easy. It is very, very painful. . . I tell other Southeast Asian 
that you have to make the effort. Sacrifice, because it is very important to go out, to 
meet people! You have got to be able to speak Chinese. They can’t. Too difficult! Not 
everyone can learn a different language. They are lazier! I am different. I’ve always 
been a hard worker. I am not afraid of making painful efforts. I’ve been like this since 
I was little in school.  
Such comments are typical of many of the SEA-FMM in my study who, like Tuti, not 
only interpret their fellow SEA-FMMs’ behavior as “docility” but imply that it has come 
into being not owing to the oppression they suffer at the hands of the receiving families, 
or simply a lack of the resources, and especially the social capital, that Tasanee can boast 
of possessing, but out of a natural inclination to be docile or to simply not want to 
change.  
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Higher stocks of capital  
Although I am using the term “self-exclusionary closure” to describe this adoptive effort 
made by SEA-FMM, in fact some C-FMM also employ this strategy and do so by speaking 
of  their  higher-than-average  stocks  of  capital.  Ting-hui,  for  example,  a  C-FMM  who 
landed a job at ING as an insurance agent, talked to me about the confidence, and the 
feeling of difference from other Chinese FMM, she has obtained through her job: 
Working at this kind of firm gives me more confidence. You know our countrymen 
[from China], everyone is busy. Their jobs are more lower-class [embarrassed], and 
everyone’s life is hard. There are not many people that are well off, because most of 
the people [FMM] who marry into Taiwan don’t come from high status [back home] 
and don’t marry into a high-status family [in Taiwan]. I feel that I am lucky, that I am 
different  from  them  [other  Chinese  FMM].  I  am  more  in  line  with  mainstream 
Taiwanese life. This job brings me into the circle and gives me more confidence. 
Tri, an Indonesian FMM, had this to say, when we were chatting about her daily life: 
I mostly hang out with my friends in the City Government [where she work]. My 
friends are those I know from work. I don’t really hang out with other Indonesians. 
My husband’s sisters and his mother [who live with me] know that my friends are all 
educated and have good [white-collar] jobs in the government. I am no ordinary 
foreign bride! They know I can’t be treated like other foreign brides! 
It is clear from Tri’s comments that while it does matter who she hangs out with, 
the more important fact for her is that she is “no ordinary foreign bride” but  rather 
someone who works for the government and socializes exclusively with her white-collar 
friends.  
We have learned how both SEA-FMM and C-FMM reveal, through their comments 
their adaptive stance of implicitly complying with the existing social hierarchy even while 
withdrawing themselves, in various ways, from the “inferior” status group. Some of the 
women  transgress  against  the  existing  social  stratification  drawing  from  their  own 
morality (Sinta and Sari), some by priding themselves on their proactive  personalities 
(Tasanee  and  Tuti),  some  by  pointing  to  their  extensive  social  networks  (Sinta  and 
Tasanee), and by essentially equating her white-collar-job with high social status (Siti and 
Ting-hui).  
Conclusion  
This study has attempted to show how Taiwan’s female marriage migrants employ social 
closure – albeit in different ways, depending on whether they have come from Mainland 
China or Southeast Asia – to help them adapt to the receiving society. We have found 
that by creating, and in some cases transforming, social closure, FMM are able to reshape 
their group identity, and to reposition themselves within the social stratification, at least Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2011 
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within  the  parameters  of  their  own  minds,  thereby  coping  with  the  discriminatory 
environment and unfavorable social hierarchy of Taiwanese society.  
Various forms of social closure have here been identified as adaptation strategies. 
Exclusionary closure is the first type employed by most of the C-FMM, who generally 
refuse to be categorized along with their SEA counterparts. By rejecting the low social 
status assigned by the host society to the FMM social group, by continually asserting 
their belief in a “bloodline” and a cultural-linguistic tradition that they supposedly share 
with the Taiwanese, and by drawing a rigid line between “us” and “them” (the SEA-
FMM),  the  C-FMM  at  least  psychologically  upgrade  their  social  position  within  the 
stratification  through  their  discourses  and  dealings  with  the  others  who  comprise 
Taiwan’s society.  
The  C-FMMs’  differentiation  of  “us”  and  “them”  often  is  supplemented  by  the 
opposite  mode  of  usurpationary  closure  to  help  them  cope  with  the  hostility  and 
mistreatment which are directed at them on a daily basis. In this second form of social 
closure,  the  C-FMM  defend  their  status  by  putting  down  the  culture  of  the  native 
Taiwanese, implicitly trying to subvert the stratification. “Culture,” and the lack thereof 
of, becomes for these women the factor which distinguishes “us Chinese-FMM,” who 
have less money but high culture, from “them”: Taiwanese who have money, but are 
vulgar.   
Whereas  most  of  the  C-FMM  in  my  study  employ  a  dual  technique  of  both 
exclusionary and usurpationary closure – on the one hand excluding the SEA-FMM from 
their  social  identifications,  on  the  other  hand  challenging  the  validity  of  the  current 
status-quo  stratification  in  Taiwan  –  the  SEA-FMM  seem  to  have  no  interest  in 
challenging, or more accurately feel they have no right to challenge, the social hierarchy. 
I have called this kind of social closure which the SEA-FMM employ “self-exclusionary,” 
for while as a group these women have no real quarrel with Taiwan’s hierarchical social 
order,  as  individuals  many  of  them  have  made  the  implicit  decision  that  social 
advancement  is  best  achieved  by  strategically  distancing  themselves  from  their  own 
social  group  (“those  Southeast  Asians”),  doing  that  by  demonstrating  their  unique 
morale,  work  ethic,  personality,  or  social  network.  Ironically  enough,  most  such 
distancing boils down to little more than socializing strictly with Taiwanese. The SEA-
FMMs’ stance of self-exclusionary closure enables them to envision themselves as full-
fledged  members  of  the  mainstream  culture,  even  as  they  keep  their  psychological 
distance  from  other  SEA-FMM  by  fully  disassociating  themselves  from  their  group’s 
position of social inferiority. 
Social  groups  employ  closure  to  generate,  maintain,  or  transform  inequality, 
mobilizing  power  so  as  to  defend  a  group’s  share  of  resources,  rewards,  or 
opportunities. After having identified these various forms of social closure, this study has 
found that they yield very different meanings, both for the C-FMM and the SEA-FMM as 
groups and for various individual women. The common denominator, however, is that all 
of the FMM employ their unique forms of social closure as adaptation strategies helping 
them to cope with the hardships they encounter as female migrants striving to adapt to 
their host family and society.      Kuo / Subversions of social hierarchy 
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I  hope  that  the  present  study  can  be  seen  as  providing  an  extension,  however 
modest, to the theory of social closure. Traditionally social closure refers to the process 
by which a social group seeks to maximize its rewards by restricting access to resources 
and opportunities. This study, however, views social closure not as a means to ensure 
monopolization but rather as a coping strategy, especially one that allows an individual 
to deal with a discriminatory environment s/he finds herself in.  More specifically, social 
closure  can  be  seen  as  a  technique  immigrants  creatively  use  to  transform  their 
precarious status within the new society. In such cases, the closure itself is the rather 
intangible reward, one that provides these migrant women with at least a psychological 
sense of group membership, even if that sense often is gained by distancing themselves 
from other groups, other individuals within their own group, or both. The gaining of that 
sense,  particularly  when  it  is  taken  in  tandem  with  “good  motherhood,”  seems  to 
represent a vital first step on these’ women’s path to a full-fledged membership in the 
new society. Even if that particular step is being taken only by female marriage migrants, 
I would suggest that in the coming years, in our increasingly globalized world where 
many people at least feel themselves to have been socially excluded on the basis of race, 
gender, or social class, more psychological forms of social closure will be appearing and 
being analyzed by researchers.   
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